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I.  Introduction
People of all political stripes tend to think of regulatory policy as involving
straightforward choices between regulation and deregulation.  Those most concerned 
with market failure and equality of outcomes favoring regulation and those with faith in 
markets and concerns about efficient outcomes favoring deregulation.  
The point of this essay is to demonstrate that government regulation, sometimes 
in heavy doses, is necessary in order for private markets to function effectively.  This 
essay illustrates this thesis, which can be summarized succinctly as arguing for 
government’s role in fostering markets (“mercerization”) by employing a number of case 
studies from the banking industry.  From these studies it is clear that, in order for markets 
to work, government regulation often is needed in order to obtain the benefits promised 
by the proponents of free-market competition.  In other words, it often is the cast that 
“freer markets need more rules.”
Deregulation often is touted as a panacea for problems created not only by 
failures of the regulatory state, but also for problems created by the politicization of the 
bureaucratic process.  But deregulation is not a cure-all for either problem.  In the 
particular case of banking, which is the subject of this Article, deregulation is not going 
to, produce better policies, and often will generate disastrous policy results.  
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3Sometimes what is paraded under the guise of regulation poses more costs on 
business and taxpayers; sometimes what appears to be regulation actual creates socially 
optimal incentives for private actors to order their behavior on their own in ways that 
benefit themselves, but also others.  
Moreover, the policy choice between de-regulation, continued regulation, and 
even the initial decision whether to regulate in the first place, all have the political 
attributes typically attributed to regulation.  Namely, these various policy choices all are 
informed by vigorous lobbying and other forms of rent-seeking.  As a consequence, the 
process by which these policy decisions were reached can tell us a great deal about the 
likely effects of such choices, both in terms of efficiency and in terms of wealth 
distribution.
Finally, turning to the specific case of banking, the economic and political 
significance of deposit insurance must be understood.  Deposit insurance is part of the 
fabric of democracy:  politicians in a political marketplace characterized by rivalrous
competition take ownership of bank failures, and must respond to such failures, either ex 
ante (before the failure) or ex post (after the failure), by providing assurances to 
depositors that they will be paid.  Thus, I will argue, in democracies, either explicit de 
jure deposit insurance, or implicit de facto deposit insurance in the form of post-failure 
guarantees must be taken into account when evaluating the merits of any proposed efforts 
to achieve deregulation.
The Article begins by providing some background about the nature of the 
business of banking, and explains the theoretical underpinnings of the thesis.  A major 
portion the Article examines actual examples of banking regulation and deregulation.  
4The conclusion is that regulation can foster markets, and that deregulation often is only 
successful when coupled with a strong guiding hand from government.  
This Article also will explore state-federal relations in order to demonstrate that 
state regulation often is sub-optimal because states are subject to a variety of moral 
hazard problems that weaken their incentives to regulate effectively.  In particular, when 
states regulate banks, they have incentives to create rules that promote excessive risk-
taking, because the states disproportionately benefit when banks are successful, but share 
losses when banks fail with other states through the U.S. system of national deposit 
insurance.
II. Banking: Economic and Political Theory
Three core structural features distinguish banks1 from other sorts of business in 
the economy.  First, banks are systematically far more highly leveraged than other sorts 
of firms in the economy.  On average, well-capitalized banks have debt-equity ratios of 
10:1, as opposed to the 1:1 debt ratios typical of non-financial firms.  
Second, banks’ balance sheets are characterized by a severe disparity in the 
characteristics of their assets and liabilities with respect to liquidity and transparency.  
Banks’ assets (commercial and home mortgage loans) tend to be highly illiquid and 
opaque, while their liabilities tend to be highly liquid and transparent (transaction 
accounts, particularly checking accounts and short-and-medium-term certificates of 
deposit).  
1
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5Finally, banks’ balance sheets are unusual because of the mismatch in the term-
structures of their assets and liabilities.  Bank assets tend to be invested in long-term 
instruments, i.e. loans to commercial and residential borrowers, while their liabilities take 
the form of deposits, most of which are available on demand (demand checking 
accounts), or in the extremely short-term (federal funds and short-term certificates of 
deposit).  While the precise relationships change over time, it is not unusual for the
average maturity of banks’ liabilities to be only six months, with the average maturity of 
banks’ assets being six years in duration.
These core characteristics of banks are endogenous.  Specifically, these 
characteristics pre-date exogenous regulatory events such as the introduction of 
government-issued currency to replace bank-issued specie, and, of course, the more 
recent introduction of deposit insurance.  These fundamental, defining characteristics of 
banks are due to the existence of economies of scope that are generated with lending and 
deposit-taking are combined: lending requires close monitoring of borrowers, and 
deposit-taking facilitates such monitoring be giving bankers accurate, real-time 
information about borrowers’ cash flows.  Moreover, banks’ ability to attain profitability 
is closely linked to these characteristics, as the spread, or difference, between what banks 
pay to attract deposits and other liabilities and what they earn on their loans and other 
assets.  
The core characteristics of banks that I have just described make banks 
particularly susceptible to runs and panics.  Banks are inherently unstable because 
depositors have access to banks’ liquidity on a first-come, first-served basis.  This means 
that if depositors experience an unexpectedly large demand for liquidity, banks will 
6encounter a “run,” as word of the liquidity demand spreads, and depositors attempt to 
protect themselves by cashing in their accounts.  
In other words, bank depositors face a prisoners’ dilemma.  The best strategy for 
depositors as a group is to refrain from withdrawing their funds precipitously, and to base 
withdrawal decisions not on what other depositors do, but on their own, endogenous need 
for liquidity over their life cycles.  By contrast, the safest strategy for depositors as 
individuals is to withdraw their funds the moment they hear the slightest rumor of 
financial weakness within the bank, or even unusual activity among depositors.  This is 
because no bank is able to meet the liquidity needs of all of its depositors at once, in light 
of the banks high leverage, low liquidity, and the mismatch in the term-structure of its 
assets and liabilities.  Banks, in the absence of a creditable deposit insurance regime, are 
extremely unstable creatures.  That is why even the most free- market observers, such as 
Milton Friedman and Catherine England (Cato Institute) favor federally sponsored 
deposit insurance plans, at least as an option for banks and depositors.2
The notable lack of success of private (and even state-based)3 deposit insurance 
funds due to lack of credibility and transparency, coupled with the over all economic 
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7importance of banks in allocating capital and serving as repositories for savings, creates a 
demand for regulation.  Banks are critical to markets; however, in order to create a 
market for banks, government regulation of deposit insurance is needed.  
In turn, the existence of governmentally-sponsored deposit insurance schemes 
create a demand for massive government regulation, because once the government enters 
the business of offering deposit insurance, it must take steps to limit its liability and to 
curb the inevitable moral hazard that results from bankers trying to transfer wealth from 
the government’s insurance fund to themselves by increasing the riskiness of their 
activities once the deposit insurance scheme is in place.
Milton Friedman’s core idea was that government regulation of some kind was 
necessary to prevent bank failure.  Regulation could take the form of deposit insurance, 
which operates ex ante to prevent bank runs and panics, or it could operate ex post by 
using monetary policy orchestrated by the central bank to inject money into the system 
and provide liquidity for banks that were the subject of runs and panics.  In their 
Monetary History of the United States, Friedman and Schwartz observe that the Federal 
Reserve failed to do its job during the banking crisis that followed the stock market 
collapse in 1939.  They argued that the Fed had permitted a collapse of the monetary 
system by permitting perfectly sound banks to fail by the thousands because of liquidity 
problems, despite the fact that the Fed had been set up in 1913 with the objective of 
preventing precisely that from occurring.  Friedman and Schwartz argued that, because 
the Fed had failed in its responsibilities and showed no sign that it was not going to 
continue to fail in pursuing its function in the future, “something else was needed to 
F., Similarities and Dissimilarities in the Collapses of Three State-Chartered Private Deposit Insurance 
Funds, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Working Paper. No. 9411. October 1994. 
8perform the function for which it had originally been established and…the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation would serve that function.”4
As Professor Friedman has pointed out, deposit insurance worked extremely well 
for over forty years in accomplishing its stated purpose of preventing bank failures.  As 
he has observed, from 1934 until the early '70s, there were very few bank failures. And 
there were essentially no runs on banks because of liquidity problems. 
In addition to the view of market-oriented economists that deposit insurance, and 
hence government regulation, is necessary simply to permit banks to operate in the 
market without causing major macro-economic dislocation, there is an independent 
reason based on real-world political considerations why government-sponsored deposit 
insurance is critical to a well-functioning economy.  This analysis is based on the 
straightforward assumption that banks, like all other firms and individuals in the 
economy, operate in a world in which there is government.  
And, where there is government, even where there is no governmental regulation, 
there is always the potential for governmental regulation.  As such, it is critical for 
policy-makers and analysts to recognize that the level of governmental regulation at time 
“1” will effect the government’s predicted response to an event at time “2”.  As such, 
where banks operate in democracies, political actors are subject to “Darwinian-like” 
political pressures.  This means that, irrespective of one’s philosophical preference for a 
libertarian state, the actual regulation that one, in fact, observes will be determined by the 
necessity for political actors (politicians and bureaucrats) to maintain a certain level of 
4
  Interview with Milton Friedman, June 1992, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, available at 
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merits, may not be a viable survival strategy for political actors.  
This analysis has profound implications for the “regulation-deregulation debate” 
Those in favor of deregulation must find a way to implement it that is consistent with the 
basic need of political actors for survival.  Otherwise, to press for deregulation (or 
regulation) in the face of widespread, well-organized political opposition can never 
succeed because those who support such unpopular views will be replaced by 
entrepreneurial, opportunistic politicians who oppose it.  The “take away” lesson is that 
once one admits the inevitability of certain governmental action, such as providing 
deposit insurance, or taxing corporate profits, or providing police protection for citizens, 
we similarly must acknowledge the necessity for governmental regulation.  Thus the 
question is not whether to regulate, but how to regulate most effectively.
Thus I observe that in banking, not only the actual existence, but even the 
potential existence of government contingent liability to large numbers of bank creditors 
(depositors) in case of bank insolvency, either through de jure or de facto deposit 
insurance, fundamentally changes the role of government as it relates to banking.  
As a purely descriptive (empirical) matter, governments in democracies respond 
to political pressure.  For a variety of reasons, voters feel that government is responsible 
for maintaining and/or ensuring the integrity of the banking system.  In other words, 
regardless of the nature of the regulatory regime in place in a particular jurisdiction, 
governments in democratic countries are made to feel responsible for the safety and 
soundness of their countries’ banking systems.  Regulatory theory and practice should 
take account of this political reality of actual responsibility.  One way that this political 
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reality manifests itself is in the form of bank bailouts in the case of banking crises.  There 
have been large or systemic banking failures in many industrialized democracies, 
including the U.S., Russia, the Czech Republic, Israel, Argentina, Japan, Israel, Sweden, 
Finland, Norway, the Netherlands, and France.  In every one of these countries, bank 
failures have led to a government response that has included, inter alia, the bailout of 
most, if not all, of the depositors in the bank suffering financial crisis.  
The bailouts have taken one of two forms.  In countries with de jure  deposit 
insurance regimes, such as the U.S. (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act of 1933), 
the nature and limits of the government’s exposure is set, ex ante, that is, before a 
banking crisis has manifested itself.  In other democracies that have experienced banking 
crises without the existence of FDIC insurance (Israel, Czech Republic, Sweden), the 
absence of deposit insurance has been viewed ex post (after the banking crisis has 
manifested itself) as a regulatory failure.  To cope with this failure, the government has 
acted as though it were responsible for meeting the liabilities of the failed bank.  In other 
words, where no de jure deposit insurance regime exists, there has been a de facto deposit 
insurance regime, as the government has stepped in after the fact and made good on 
depositors and other claims.
A clear implication of this political reality is that it is erroneous (an example of 
what Ronald Coase and Harold Demsetz have characterized as the “Nirvana” fallacy), to 
compare a regulatory regime, such as the one that exists in the U.S., with a mythical 
unregulated regime, in which the government can credibly commit itself to stand aside 
and watch bank failures and do nothing in response.5  In other words, the proclivity for 
5
 The Nirvana fallacy refers to the tendency to identify market failures such as externalities and then to 
conclude reflexively that government regulation would be optimal, without considering whether the 
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political survival has led politicians and policy-makers to offer bailouts even in the 
absence of explicit deposit insurance protection.  Thus the real-world policy choice in 
banking is between a regulatory regime characterized by de jure (explicit) deposit 
insurance protection, and a “non-regulatory” regime characterized by de facto (implicit, 
after the fact deposit insurance in the form of gratuitous government bailouts of failed 
banks) depositor protection after a banking crisis has manifested itself.
Seen from this real politick perspective, since deposit insurance of one of these 
two types (de jure or de facto) is inevitable, we must choose between these two regimes,
rather than between either of these regimes and some mythical alternative.  For a variety 
of reasons, I will argue that a regulatory regime of well-defined, explicit ex ante, de jure
deposit insurance is unambiguously superior to a world of undefined, implicit, ex post, de 
facto deposit insurance.  
De facto deposit insurance regimes impose uncertainties: since it is clear that 
government will be responsible for bank failures to some extent, the nature and limits of 
that responsibility is not transparent to investors in regimes with de facto rather than de 
jure deposit insurance regimes.  This uncertainty leads to two types of inefficiencies.  
First, creditors will demand compensation for the uncertainty associated with the 
lack of information and certainty concerning the nature of the governmental guarantees in 
a de facto deposit insurance regime.  
Second, greater resources will be expended in rent-seeking by creditors faced with 
a crisis in the bank or banks in which they have deposits.  This, in turn, is likely to lead to 
inefficiencies and other costs associated with such regulation outweigh the benefits.  This problem was first 
suggested by Ronald Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost,” Journal of Law and Economics 3, (October ) 1-
44 (1960), and then identified explicitly by Harold Demsetz, “Information and Efficiency: Another 
Viewpoint,” Journal of Law and Economics 12:1 (April) 1-22 (1969).
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bailouts either of all creditors (which has been the historical norm) of banks in 
democracies without de jure deposit insurance, or else to bailouts of only the most 
politically powerful creditors.  Neither of these alternatives is attractive from a public 
policy point of view because each involves the waste of real resources.  
The advantage of de jure deposit insurance, then, is that de jure  insurance reduces 
the government’s actual and contingent liability for bank failures from the totality of the 
banks’ liabilities to the amount specified in the deposit insurance legislation.  In light of 
the fact that all democracies facing systemic bank failure have bailed out all creditors, 
this represents a significant reduction in the government’s exposure.  In other words, de 
jure deposit insurance allows government to credibly commit to a relatively low level of 
protection, thus capping its liability at the amount specified in the deposit insurance 
regime.
In addition, de jure deposit insurance limits the economic waste associated with 
rent-seeking by reducing the rent-seeking that occurs in anticipation of, and in the wake 
of, bank failures by creditors seeking recourse to the government.  Thus, the best, most 
credible way for government to limit its exposure to banking crisis is to constrain itself ex 
ante by providing a regulatory scheme of  de jure deposit insurance.
Having established that  government-sponsored, statutory deposit insurance 
programs are a regulatory mechanism that is efficient as compared to the alternative, ex 
post, ad hoc, governmental responses in the wake of bank failure, the question becomes 
not whether regulation makes sense, but rather what sort of regulation makes the most 
sense.  This is because deposit insurance provides a solid, irrefutable reason for 
government regulation: such regulation is necessary for the same reason that monitoring 
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and control is required in private sector insurance markets: to mitigate what economists 
call “moral hazard problems” (moral hazard refers to the proclivity to excessive, sub-
optimal risk-taking by insured entities in order to transfer wealth from insurers to 
themselves).
Thus, the question is not whether, but how, to regulate banks in order to mitigate 
the moral hazard.  A wide array of options is available to governments and private sector 
entities in the insurance business.  We would expect that these regulations would also 
include contractual restrictions that would be applied to banks in exchange for 
government-sponsored deposit insurance regimes.  These private-sector options include:
• Entry restrictions (limiting who qualifies for insurance)
• Guidelines on capital maintenance
• Guidelines on distributions of free cash flow
• Activities restrictions and regulations
• Regulation of management quality 
• Regulation of banks’ investment policy
• Regulations requiring diversification of investments
• Restrictions on self-dealing
• Right to enter the premises and examine financial record and other 
information produced by the insured.
III. Case Study #1: The S& L Crisis
Having discussed the demand for regulation in the banking industry, we will now 
turn to the critical question of how to make government regulation in this critical area 
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function.6  Here I argue that the S&L crisis is directly attributable to deregulation that 
permitted banks to engage in excessive amounts of risk-taking.  In particular, in 1967, the 
State of Texas approved a major liberalization of S&L powers that, among other things, 
permitted S&Ls to make loans on undeveloped property, regardless of the lack of income 
generated by such property, in amounts up to 50% of the appraised net worth of such 
properties.  Then, the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 
1978 allowed S&Ls to invest up to 5% of their assets in each of the following types of 
loans:  development, construction and education loans.  This meant that all of a S&Ls 
equity would be at risk, not from fluctuations in the relatively stable home mortgage 
market, but from fluctuations in the notoriously volatile real estate development and 
construction markets.7
During the period 1980-1982, the pace of deregulation quickened even further.  
Statutory and regulatory changes gave the S&L industry new powers in order to permit 
them to enter new areas of business in order to promote greater profitability.  For the first 
time in history, the government approved measures aimed at improving S&L profitability 
rather than promoting the traditional, fiscally conservative goals of promoting broader 
access to housing and home ownership.  
In March 1980, the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control 
Act (DIDMCA) was enacted.  The statute, promulgated during the Carter Administration, 
removed interest rate ceilings on deposit accounts, and expanded the ability of federally 
6
   For an excellent earlier treatment of the same subject in this context, see Martin A. Levin and Mary 
Bryna Sanger, Making Government Work: How Entrepreneurial Executives Turn Bright Ideas into Real 
Results (1994).
7
 This history draws heavily on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s monograph, “The S&L Crisis: 
A Chrono-Bibliography,” www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/s&l.  
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chartered S&Ls to make loans for corporate acquisitions and commercial development 
and construction projects.  Finally, DIDMCA raised the ceiling on government deposit 
insurance from $40,000 to $100,000, without adding any additional restraints or 
regulation to diminish moral hazard such as promulgating regulations that link insurance 
premiums to risk.  
In November 1980, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) reduced the 
minimum capital requirements for federally insured S&Ls from 5 percent of total 
deposits to 4 percent of total deposits.  Also that month, the FHLBB also reduced curbs 
on risk-taking by removing regulatory limits on the amount of brokered deposits (hot 
money) that S&Ls could hold.8
These reforms were followed in August by the Tax Reform Act of 1981, which 
provided powerful tax incentives for real estate investment by individuals, helping to 
create a strong demand for real estate loans, and leading to extensive over-building.  
In September 1981, the FHLBB permitted troubled S&Ls to meet their recently 
reduced minimum capital requirements by issuing so-called “income capital certificates” 
that were included as equity capital on S&L balance sheets.  The effect of these 
certificates was to make insolvent financial institutions appear, for regulatory accounting 
purposes, as though they were solvent.  These certificates did not comply with Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), either for banks or for any other type of 
8
  The term "brokered deposits" refers to blocks of funds pooled by securities broker/dealers and then 
placed in depository institutions offering the highest (federally insured) yield. During the thrift crisis of the 
1980s, many failing institutions used brokered deposits to "gamble on resurrection." As a result, 
supervisors now closely monitor institutions that rely heavily on this type of funding. See 
http://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/cb/2003/d/pages/cedars_deposits.html 
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business.  Such certificates, if issued by private firms, would have constituted securities 
fraud.
These deregulatory efforts were followed during the period 1982-1985 by 
significant reductions in the FHLBB regulatory and supervisory staffs at a time when the 
industry was growing by leaps and bounds.  In the 1982-1985 period of staff reductions, 
S&L industry assets (loans) increased by 56 percent.  Forty Texas S&Ls tripled in sized, 
and many S&Ls in California and Texas grew at rates in excess of 100 percent per year.  
Like much of S&L “deregulation” of the era, these regulations are better 
described as “de-marketization” or “dis-incentivization” because of the perverse 
incentives they created.  For example, in January 1982, the FHLBB reduced net worth 
requirements for insured S&Ls from 4 percent to 3 percent of total deposits.  S&Ls were 
allowed to depart from GAAP still further through the introduction of new,  so-called 
“Regulatory Accounting Principles” (RAP) which only applied to S&Ls, were 
inconsistent with GAAP, and which permitted banks to artificially pad their balance 
sheets, claiming that they had far more capital than was, in fact, the case. As one 
Congressman flamboyantly, but accurately, observed, RAP: 
is a set of rules invented during the Reagan administration 
as one of the kingpin codes of deregulation.  As described by one 
congressman, “this new set of accounting principles was really an 
invitation to fiscal conspiracy, a tool for deception and fraud, a 
vehicle for the perpetuation of elite stealing. RAP guaranteed the 
monumental expansion of phony bookkeeping. RAP made the 
present savings and loan debacle inevitable.  The S&L RAP is an 
amazing creation. In summary, it was an admission that the books 
(of federally insured S&Ls) could not be balanced and time-
honored standards (GAAP) could not be met. The bureaucratic 
solution was to redefine the meaning of balanced books and set the 
standards lower. Instead of solving the problem a decision was 
made to hide the problem in a grand embrace.  
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A transfusion of new official jargon gave new life to the 
network of racketeering enterprises that infested the country. The 
day of reckoning was delayed with a device offered by that same 
government which would later have to pay the bill. More time was 
granted for new schemes and conspiracies. New opportunities were 
provided for the massive siphoning operations to be executed. The 
great swindlers knew that the day of reckoning was coming but 
RAP gave them a new extension.9
In April 1982, the FHLBB issued new regulations that made it much easier for 
risk- taking speculators to purchase S&Ls.  These new regulations eliminated restrictions 
on the minimum number of S&L shareholders.  Previous regulations required that each 
S&L have at least 400 stockholders, at least 125 of whom were from the “local 
community.”   Also, no individual could own more than 10% of the stock of an S&L, and 
no “controlling group” could own more than 25% of an S&L’s stock.  The new 
regulations permitted single owners for S&Ls, thus reducing market monitoring and 
creating incentives for excessive loan concentrations among borrowers.  In particular, 
these regulations made it easier for individuals to buy S&Ls by allowing them to put up 
land and other hard-to-value real estate assets, as opposed to cash, when purchasing 
ownership interests in a thrift institution.     
It was in late 1982, however, that the real “race to the bottom” began among 
regulators.  In December 1982, Congress passed the Garn-St. Germain Depository 
Institutions Act of 1982.  This Reagan Administration initiative was designed to give 
even broader powers to federally chartered S&Ls with a view to making them more 
profitable, as well as more diversified.  The major provisions of the statute included 
eliminating the ceilings on interest rates paid on deposits, eliminating the previous 
statutory restrictions on loan-to-value ratios, and expanding the powers of federal S&Ls 
9
   Hon. Major R. Owens, U.S. House of Representatives, July 20, 1990
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to invest in assets unrelated to the business of making home mortgages by permitting 
S&Ls with federal charters to put up to 40% of their assets in commercial mortgages, up 
to 30% of their assets in consumer loans and up to 10% of their assets in commercial 
loans, and up to 10% in commercial leases.  
The Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act caused immediate, massive 
defections of state chartered banks to the federal system so that bank equity holders could 
avail themselves of the expanded powers permitted under the Act.  Soon thereafter, 
California, followed closely by Texas and Florida, passed state law permitting state-
chartered (but federally insured) S&Ls to invest 100% of deposits in any sort of venture 
whatsoever.  Within a year, 10% of all S&Ls were insolvent as measured by standards 
consistent with GAAP.  These S&Ls were permitted to remain open because they were 
not insolvent when the artificial equity permitted under RAP was included in their 
balance sheets, and they retained their ability to attract additional liquidity to meet current 
financial obligations because the liquidity came in the form of federally insured deposits, 
which they could attract by offering slightly higher rates of interest or other inducements 
(toaster ovens, televisions, etc.,) to depositors.  
Thirty-five percent of all S&Ls were losing money by 1983.  Such a result, along 
with the high number of bank failures (10%) reported in the previous paragraph, is 
consistent with the conclusion that banks were taking advantage of their new powers by 
engaging in excessive risk-taking of the “heads-I-win, tails-the-taxpayer-loses” variety.  
Shareholders, as equity claimants, benefited from the higher returns garnered when 
excessive risks pay-off.  The government and, ultimately, taxpayers bore the brunt of the 
burden when the heavily leveraged banks became insolvent.  
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To understand this basic application of financial theory, imagine a bank that is 
barely solvent.  The bank has $100 million in assets and $99.9 million in liabilities, 
leaving it with $100,000 in equity.10   Suppose the bank shifts its assets from relatively 
safe home mortgages to a high risk investment in real estate with payoff characteristics 
such that there is a .5 probability that the bank will lose one-half of its net worth ($50 
million) and a .5 probability that the bank will garner a return of 50 percent, resulting in a 
new net worth of $50 million.  
If the first, negative result materializes, the shareholders will have lost only their 
equity, $100,000.  The depositors or, more accurately, the government-sponsored deposit 
insurance fund (together with the uninsured depositors, if any) will have lost the balance 
of $49.9 million.   Alternatively, if the second, positive result materializes, the 
shareholders will have gained $50 million, and the government-sponsored deposit 
insurance fund and uninsured depositors will have gained nothing.  More generally, this 
investment has an expected payoff to depositors of $24,900,000 [.5(-$100,000) X 
.5($50,000,000)].  Holding expected returns (expected returns are the sum of the possible 
outcomes, when each possible outcome is multiplied by its respective probability) 
constant, the riskier the venture (as measured by the standard deviation of expected 
outcomes), the more valuable the venture is, ex ante, to equity investors.  
The deregulatory process just described had a profound effect on the risk -taking 
proclivities of S&L owners.  Once the regulatory constraints were removed and 
government-sponsored deposit insurance was still available at low, fixed cost (i.e. not 
adjusted for risk), acute moral hazard in the form of providing extremely strong perverse 
incentives for S&L shareholder-owners to engage in excessive risk-taking emerged.  The 
10
   This follows from the basic balance sheet equation, (assets – liabilities = equity).   
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consequences of this for U.S. taxpayers were significant.  Fixed claimants had no 
incentives to monitor banks’ excessive risk-taking because deposit insurance insulated 
them from the consequences of such risk-taking.  
Without government regulation to substitute for the market discipline typically 
supplied by contractual fixed claimants, disaster ensued.  In other words, supporters of 
deregulation of the S&L industry failed to perceive that government regulation in an 
environment of insured depository institutions is necessary for the stability of the 
financial system.  Such government regulation serves as a necessary substitute for the 
restrictions that private sector creditors would place on risk- taking by borrowers.11
It has been suggested that the debacle of the S&L de-marketization resulted “not 
so much from poor policy choices as from flawed management of the deregulation 
process.”12  It is certainly true that loosening government constraints on banks required 
more rather than less regulatory oversight.  However, it is mistaken to conclude that the 
disastrous de-marketization of the S&L regulation was a consequence merely of poor 
policy choices or of a failed ideology.  The better explanation is rent-seeking.  These so-
called “de-regulatory” policies, which enriched equity owners of S&Ls, resulted from a 
desire to garner political support from politically powerful bankers, particularly in the 
key election states of California, Florida and Texas.  For example, in April 1987, shortly 
before he was forced to resign as chair of the FHLBB, Edwin Gray was summoned to the 
office of Senator Dennis DeConcini, who along with four other Senators (John McCain, 
11
 Clifford C.  Smith, C. and Jerold C. Warner, 1979, "On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond 
Covenants", Journal of Financial Economics 7, June, 117-161.
12 Martin A. Levin and Mary Bryna Sanger, Making Government Work: How Entrepreneurial Executives 
Turn Bright Ideas into Real Results, supra, at 42.
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Alan Cranston, John Glenn and Donald Riegle) questioned Gray about the 
appropriateness of FHLBB investigations into Charles Keating’s Lincoln Savings and 
Loan.  All five senators, who later came to be known as the “Keating Five” received 
campaign contributions from Keating.  The subsequent failure of Lincoln Savings and 
Loan was estimated to have cost the government over $2 billion.13
This case study shows that rent-seeking and other forms of abuse of the 
government decision-making process manifests itself in the form of so-called 
“deregulation” as readily as it manifests itself in the form of regulation.  This is a 
straightforward application of the insight that the power to deregulate, like the power to 
regulate,14 and the power to refrain from regulating,15 are tempting sources of rent for 
governmental actors and thereby provide valuable rent-seeking opportunities for interest 
groups.  
Students of public policy and others interested in improving the quality of 
regulation and policy formation should understand the incentive structure under which 
13
 See FDIC, History of the S&L Crisis, available at www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/s&l. 
14
 1971 The notion of using regulation to benefit private parties rather than to serve the public interest was 
first developed formally by the University of Chicago's George Stigler who modeled the regulatory process 
as a function of the government’s ability to benefit private parties by, restricting entry into markets, 
policing cartels, and legitimizing various price-fixing strategies.  These devices, Stigler showed, make it 
possible through for private firms able to galvanize into effective political coalitions, to earn super-
competitive returns called economic rents.  In a nutshell, Stigler showed hw regulation was can benefit the 
regulated, rather than the public.  . According toe Stigler the market for regulation consisted of providing 
value to politicians in the form of campaign contributions, efforts to organize voting, intimations of future 
jobs, and occasional outright bribes in return for favorable regulation. Major research advancing the “rent-
seeking” (also known as the {“public choice”) approach to regulation has been contributed by  James 
Buchanan, Sam Peltzman, Robert Tollison and Gordon Tullock.  Consistent with one of the principal 
insights of this school of thought, this Article models politicians, bureaucrats and others involved in the 
policy-making process as rational economic actors who, subject to a variety of constraints act in their own 
self-interest, rather than some vaguely defined conception of the private interest.  Students of public policy 
and others interested in improving the quality of regulation and policy formation should understand the 
incentive structure under which policy-makers and regulators operate.
15
  Fred S. McChesney, Money for Nothing: Politicians, Rent Extraction and Political Extortion, Harvard 
University Press (1977). 
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policy-makers and regulators operate.  As was shown in the case of the S&L crisis, the 
failure to understand this incentive structure makes it easier for powerful interests to 
unshackle themselves from any semblance of reasonable restraints on excessive risk-
taking under the ideological guise of deregulation.
IV. Case Study #2: Lender Liability and Environmental Protection
Lender liability refers to civil liability for money damages and other relief that 
may be imposed on banks and other lenders that cause damages or act in bad faith, either 
to borrowers or to third parties outside of the debtor-creditor relationship.  For example, 
where a bank makes explicit or implicit promises to extend credit and then imposes harm 
on a client by reneging on the promise, the lender is likely to be liable to the client.  
Similarly, when a particular lender takes actions that impose harm on third parties, such 
as other creditors, by improperly diverting assets of the debtors to itself, the third party 
can bring a lawsuit against the lender.  So, for example, where a bank has loaned a client 
money, and uses its influence, and/or its access to the client’s transaction accounts to 
benefit itself at the expense of other, similarly situated or senior creditors, these creditors 
can seek civil remedies against the bank for damages.
An intense area of uncertainty in lender liability that involves very high stakes 
claims is the area of lender liability for environmental damage on the debtor’s property.  
The problem begins with the so-called Super Fund statute, also known as the federal 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). 16
CERCLA imposes cleanup costs on “owners” or “operators” of hazardous waste 
sites, without regard to fault.  The problem is that, as often happens when borrowers 
become financially distressed, large bank lenders, who often have a security interest in all 
16
  42 U.S.C. Sections 9601-9657
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of the borrower’s assets, will actually take over the day-to-day operation of the debtor’s 
plant when the borrower defaults.  Where there is hazardous waste on the site, if the bank 
is deemed to have become an “operator” of the facility within the meaning of CERCLA, 
then it will be strictly liable for the costs of cleaning up the facility, regardless of when 
the damage occurred.  
In order to protect banks and other secured lenders from the broad liability of 
CERCLA, the statute contains a specific exemption for a person who “without 
participating in the management of a facility holds indicia of ownership primarily to 
protect his security interest in the facility.”17  However, the contours of the statutory 
exemption for secured lenders is a bit vague, since it leaves open to (statutory) 
interpretation the question of what it means to participate in management, or to hold 
indicia of ownership “primarily to protect” one’s security interest.  Of course, there is no 
problem as long as the borrower is making timely payments of principal and interest.  
Once a borrower defaults, however, and the lender takes possession of the collateral, it is 
difficult to avoid the argument that the bank is participating in management, where the 
collateral is the entire facility.  
The potential for CERCLA to impose millions of dollars in liability on banks, 
despite the statute’s exemptive language, manifested itself in the early 1990s when judges 
began interpreting the meaning of the “operator” language in CERCLA.  In particular, in 
United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.,18  the court held that 
17
   42 U.S.C. Section 9601(20)(A).
18
   901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991) 
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“a secured creditor may incur [strict liability for the costs of 
an environmental clean-up under CERCLA] by participating in the 
financial management of a facility to a degree indicating a (mere) 
capacity to influence the corporation’s treatment of hazardous 
wastes.  It is not necessary for the secured creditor actually to 
involve itself in the day-to-day operations in order to be liable  --
although such conduct will certainly lead to the loss of the 
protection of the statutory exemption.  Nor is it necessary for the 
secured creditor to participate in management decisions relating to 
hazardous waste.  Rather, a secured creditor will be liable if its 
involvement with the management of the facility is sufficiently 
broad to support the inference that it could affect hazardous waste 
disposal decisions if it so chose.”19
This opinion sent shocks through the financial community as banks and other 
secured lenders fretted that they would have to choose between the unattractive 
alternative relinquishing their ability to take possession of their collateral in case of 
default and the even worse alternative of taking action that might lead to potentially 
devastating claims for clean up costs under CERCLA.
In the wake of the decision in Fleet Factors, lawyers for secured lenders began 
advising their clients about how to avoid liability under CERCLA should their borrowers 
default.  Lawyers began advising their clients to stop such common, and socially 
desirable, activities as monitoring facility operations, monitoring compliance with legal 
requirements of federal and local environmental codes, and providing strategic and 
financial advice to borrowers in distress, all because lawyers were concerned that such 
activities would make the lenders strictly liable as operators of a facility because they had 
“participated in management,” either generally or with regard to environmental issues.  
For example, prior to the misguided decision in Fleet Factors, it was common for 
lenders to inspect the property of prospective borrowers for environmental problems, and 
to demand that these problems be corrected before making a loan.  It was also common 
19 Ibid.
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for secured lenders to protect their investments in the borrower by requiring periodic 
reports from borrowers on compliance with applicable environmental regulations, and by 
making periodic environmental inspections of the borrower’s facilities to make sure that 
the reports were accurate.  Lawyers began advising clients that, in the wake of Fleet 
Factors, these sorts of activities by lenders, however socially desirable, could lead to 
strict liability for environmental claims under CERCLA.  
Because of the language in Fleet Factors that environmental liability could result 
where there was a “capacity to influence” the treatment of hazardous wastes, well-
advised lenders were reluctant to condition the extension of credit on promises by the 
lender to maintain environmental safeguards.  
Environmental activists and the professionals at the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) naturally wanted to restore lenders’ incentives to proactively 
manage environmental risk.  In response, the EPA enacted a detailed new rule, clarifying 
lender liability under CERCLA.20
The new rule overruled the Eleventh Circuit decision in Fleet Factors by making 
it clear that the “mere capacity to influence or the ability to influence, or the unexercised 
right to control” does not constitute control so as to trigger liability under the strict 
liability provisions of CERCLA.  Also, to encourage monitoring, the rule provides that 
liability will not result where lenders impose contractual or other documentary 
requirements on borrowers that they will maintain certain environmental standards.  
Similarly, no liability will result where lenders require, as a condition for a loan, that the 
20
  Environmental Protection Agency, National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan: 
Lender Liability Under CERCLA, 57 Federal Register 18,344 (April 29, 1992).  
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borrower make representations, warranties, covenants or other promises to maintain 
environmental quality.
Under Fleet Factors these sorts of activities might be construed as opening banks 
to liability for having participated in management by having the “capacity” to affect 
hazardous waste disposal decisions if it so chose.  The EPA regulation modifying the 
result in Fleet Factors is a clear example of “marketization” by a regulatory agency.  The 
outcome in Fleet Factors had the unintended consequence of removing the incentives of 
an important class of market participants, banks, to engage in the socially desirable 
activity of monitoring and controlling their borrowers’ disposal of hazardous waste.  By 
crafting a clear rule that provided protection from CERCLA liability for banks who made 
sure that their clients complied with the environmental laws, the EPA, by regulation, 
corrected a market distortion caused by a poorly reasoned judicial decision.  
The EPA rule followed extensive consultation with banks, environmental groups 
and other affected parties.  While the EPA ruling may have reflected political pressure by 
banking interests, this simplistic explanation of the rule is unconvincing.  For one thing, 
banks are not repeat player constituents of the EPA, and are therefore not likely to be 
interested in spending the resources necessary to “capture” the Agency, even if they 
could.  Moreover, environmental groups, who are, of course, repeat players before the 
EPA, also favored amending the rule because they, like the banks, favored creating a 
“safe harbor” from CERCLA liability for bank monitoring of environmental hazards.  
Finally, firms themselves were not adverse to this rule, because the potential liability 
imposed by the Eleventh Circuit decision in Fleet Factors raised the cost of capital and 
made banks unwilling to lend at a competitive rate to financially precarious firms with 
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potential environmental issues that needed close monitoring.21  Thus, in this example, the 
political support maximizing solution for the regulators at the EPA was also the efficient 
and socially optimal solution.
V. Case Study #3-5: Marketization and Federal-State Relations in Banking
The U.S. banking system operates under a system of dual state and federal 
chartering and safety and soundness regulation.  The “dual banking system” long has 
enjoyed significant political support.  The dual banking system ostensibly allows banks 
operating in any state to choose between two different sets of primary laws to define their 
powers and to regulate their activities and investments.  Banks may opt for a national 
charter, and be regulated by the Comptroller of the Currency, or they may pursue a state 
charter, in which case their primary regulator will be the banking regulator of the 
chartering state.
It once was thought that the so-called dual banking system created good 
incentives for regulators, resulting in “the maximum freedom from regulation consistent 
with a safe and sound banking system.”22
The dual banking system “has long been a sacred cow in the American political 
tradition.”23  A primary justification for the dual banking system is that it causes state and 
21
 The history of this controversy subsequent to the implementation of the EPA rules is fascinating.  After 
the EPA issued its rule, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the rule on 
the Constitutional ground that it was beyond the EPA’s statutory authority to implement a rule construing 
the statutory provisions of  CERCLA.  This created tension between the executive branch and the judicial 
branch, as both the EPA and the Department of Justice publicly announced that they would follow the EPA 
rule anyway as a matter of their own administrative discretion to pick and choose cases for enforcement 
action.  This controversy was resolved when Congress, as part of a Defense Department Appropriations 
measure reincarnated the EPA’s rule and forbade further judicial review, finally making it clear that the 
EPA rule is the authoritative interpretation of the statutory secured lender exception to CERCLA.
22
  G. Benston, R. Eisenbeis, P. Horvitz, E. Kane & G. Kaufman, Perspectives on Safe and Sound Banking: 
Past, Present and Future 276-78 (1986), Robert Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition 
in Regulation, 20 Stanford Law Review 1 (1977).  
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federal regulators “to compete for bank charters in order to retain market share.”24  This 
competition is said to lead to a diminution in the arbitrary or abusive use of regulatory 
discretion.  Detractors of the dual banking system argue that the system leads to a 
destructive “race to the bottom” among regulators who compete to attract chartering 
business from banks.
Neither of these arguments gives proper credit or respect to the reality of post-
Roosevelt era constitutional interpretation.  The federal government can – and does –
invoke the Commerce and Supremacy clauses of the U.S. Constitution to preempt state 
laws whenever state laws give state-chartered banks a meaningful advantage over federal 
banks.  And, even if that were not true, as a matter of both legal compulsion and 
competitive necessity, all banks must obtain deposit insurance from the federal 
government, and the FDIC requires that banks obtaining such insurance comply with its 
uniform regulations regardless of contrary provisions in the laws of individual states.25
Here there are two related points about regulation in general and state-federal 
relations in particular.  First, the competition between the states and the federal 
government in the domain of banking law and regulation is more imagined than real.  
Second, the paucity of meaningful competition within the U.S. federal system is socially 
desirable because competition between the states and the federal government in the realm 
of banking regulation would not produce beneficial results if it were to occur.  
A.  Reserve Requirements
23
 G. Miller, The Future of the Dual Banking System, 53 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1 (1987).
24
   R. Carnell, J. Macey and G. Miller, Banking Law & Regulation 115 (third edition 2002).
25
   H. Butler and J. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System, 73 Cornell Law 
Review, 677 (1988).
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The history of reserve requirement regulations for state-chartered and federally-
chartered banks provides a prime example of states’ perverse incentives to regulate their 
domestically chartered banks in an optimal way.  Reserve requirements consist of bank 
assets that must be held in the form of vault cash or non-interest paying deposits with one 
of the regional Federal Reserve banks or with banks approved by the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System.  Because banks do not generate any interest or other 
income on these reserves, which consist of cash-on-hand and non-interest bearing 
accounts at the central bank, they would prefer that reserve requirements be kept as low 
as possible.  From a financial perspective, reserves are viewed as a tax on banks’ 
operations.  Prior to 1980, national banks and state banks that had elected to be members 
of the Federal Reserve System were subject to reserve requirements established by 
federal regulation.  State-chartered banks that were not members of the Federal Reserve 
System were not subject to these federal regulations. To avoid reserve requirements, 
which cut into banks’ profitability, state banks began exiting the Federal Reserve System.  
In response, bank regulators passed the Depository Institutions Deregulation and 
Monetary Control Act of 1980, which extended the reach of the Federal Reserve 
requirements to state non-Member banks.  
This federal statute eliminated a major dimension of the competition within the 
dual banking system.  The decision by Congress to impose standardized minimum 
reserve requirements was clearly inconsistent with the idea of competition in the dual 
banking system.  The harder question is the normative one: whether competition between 
state and federal chartering agencies and regulators would be beneficial in banking.  The 
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problem, as the reserve requirement controversy illustrates so aptly, is that the states have 
no incentive to enact laws that constrain banks’ proclivities towards excessive risk-taking. 
To the extent that lax state laws permit banks to engage in excessive risk-taking, 
the benefits from such risk-taking fall on certain local borrowers (who would be unable to 
obtain credit under a more prudent regulatory regime) and often local shareholders (only 
a small percentage of banks are publicly held), who, as residual claimants, benefit if the 
risks pay off.  By contrast, the costs of such risk-taking are borne not by private sector 
creditors of the state-chartered banks, and not by the banks’ state regulators, but rather by 
the federal government (and depositors and taxpayers in all fifty states), who bear the 
costs of administering and funding the federal deposit insurance funds.
In other words, the costs of lax state regulation are borne at the federal level, and 
the benefits accrue locally, at the state level, where banks lend money.  Since the 
allocation of regulatory authority should track the incentives associated with regulating 
prudently, the dual banking system is a very bad policy idea in a regulatory regime like 
the U.S. that is characterized by federal deposit insurance.  Thus, it is no surprise that in 
1991, Congress passed a statute, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement 
Act (FDICIA), that provided, inter alia, that no state bank insured by the FDIC could 
engage in any type of activity that is not permissible for a national bank, unless a federal 
agency determines that the activity would pose no significant risk to the deposit insurance 
fund and the state bank applies with applicable capital standards.26
This legislation strengthens the argument, originally set forth in Butler-Macey 
that the dual banking system is, and should be, a myth.  More importantly, the interplay 
between the states and the federal government provides another example of both “illusory 
26
 12 U.S.C. Section 1831a.
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deregulation” and the related phenomenon, incentive-enhancing regulation that either 
encourages, or replaces, market-driven responses to public policy problems.
With respect to the first point, about illusory deregulation, clearly the elimination 
or reduction of reserve requirements by a state banking regulator appears to be an effort 
to achieve deregulation.  However, when viewed against the background existence of 
federally sponsored deposit insurance, the reality emerges.  Such deregulation is simply 
an effort by local regulators to export the costs of tolerating excessive risk-taking by 
bankers nationally.  This enables the local regulators to enjoy greater political support 
from bankers, while exporting the costs of their “deregulation” onto the general 
population.  Such actions are not deregulation: they simply reflect bad, perhaps even 
corrupt, public policy choices.  In other words it might be more helpful to talk about 
regulation that preserves incentives, and to contrast that with regulation that destroys 
incentives.  State reserve requirement “deregulation” was really incentive-destroying 
regulation.  Pre-emption and re-regulation by the Congress restored the proper incentive 
structure for banks, because it reduced banks’ proclivity to succumb to the moral hazard 
of excessive risk-taking.
B. Bank Closure Policy
Bank failure is the event against which the entire administrative scheme of 
regulation and enforcement in the banking industry is based.  Bank failure is a concern as 
a matter of public policy in ways that the failure of other business is not for several 
reasons.  First, and most obviously, the failure of an FDIC insured depository institution 
places the assets of the government’s insurance fund at risk.  In addition, bank failures 
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impose losses, anxiety, and inconvenience on depositors.  Finally, the failure of one bank 
may spread to others, creating the danger of generalized banking panics.27
One of the more startling historical attributes of the dual banking system is that 
the power to cause the appointment of a receiver for a financially distressed bank, i.e. the 
power to close a bank, was vested in the bank’s chartering agency.  Thus, the Comptroller 
of the Currency has the power to close national banks and, at least until 1991, state 
banking agencies had the exclusive power to close state-chartered banks, including 
federally insured banks and thrift institutions.  The problem with this allocation or 
regulatory power was that state banking regulators had no incentive to close failed state-
chartered banks, as long as those banks continued to employ people and as long as those 
banks continue to make loans to local borrowers.  Bank closures are also problematic 
because they lead to rashes of foreclosures of delinquent loans by the receiver of the 
failed banks, and other events, such as strict adherence to debt covenants, which, from a 
macroeconomic perspective, are highly deflationary to local economies.
Thus, as with reserve requirements, recalcitrant state bank regulators, particularly 
in Arizona, California, Florida, and Texas, were able to transfer wealth to themselves 
from the federal deposit insurance fund as administrative delay increased the ultimate 
costs of resolving bank failures of state-chartered banks.  As the costs of bailing out the 
insurance funds soared in the 1980s, and the issue of bank failure became politically 
salient, Congress finally, in the Federal Deposit Insurance Company Improvement Act of 
1991 (FDICIA), gave the FDIC the power to close state-chartered insured banks in cases 
in which such closure is necessary to avoid or mitigate losses to the insurance fund. 
27
 Carnell. Macey and Miller, supra, at 723.
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While FDICIA clearly represents encroachment by federal regulators onto turf 
long occupied by state regulators, it also is consistent with market principles and 
economic theory, because it allocates regulatory responsibility over bank closure to the 
regulator with the greatest stake in implementing optimal closure policy.  Thus, the 
provisions of FDICIA wresting regulatory authority over the timing of bank closures 
away from state regulators is an example of market-based, incentive-compatible 
regulation.
C. Minimum Capital Requirements
While the term “capital” is used in a variety of different contexts in banking and 
finance, for purposes of this Article, capital refers to the amount by which a business’s 
assets exceed its liabilities.  The terms “equity” and “net worth” also are used to describe 
this differential.  For most businesses, the amount of capital that a firm has is regulated 
entirely by market forces, as it should be in a free market economy.  Firms that want to 
borrow money must have a certain amount of equity as a cushion for the lenders, in case 
the value of the firms’ assets unexpectedly declines.  Similarly, lenders often will impose 
various restrictions on the type and amount of subsequent borrowing that their clients will 
be permitted to do.  Borrowers who don’t want this sort of market-based restriction on 
their capital structure must refrain from borrowing, or pay higher rates of interest to 
compensate lenders for their perceived risk. 
In theory, at least, if a bank has enough capital, its creditors will never suffer 
losses.  This is because as long as a bank’s assets can be sold for more than the amount of 
their liabilities (plus the administrative costs associated with the asset sale, and 
subsequent distribution of cash), the institution’s creditors will be repaid in full.  One of 
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the problems observed in the discussion of bank closure policy in the previous section 
was that state regulators who kept state-chartered banks open after they were actually 
insolvent increased the ultimate size of the losses shouldered by the federal deposit 
insurance agencies, since the quality of banks’ assets would erode, and bank shareholders 
would engage in excessively desperate, and risky, attempts to return the bank to solvency.  
The regulatory issues associated with minimum capital requirements are nicely 
summarized in a U.S. Treasury report:
In a private, competitive market economy, the primary 
purpose of capital is to cushion both equity holders and debt 
holders from unexpected losses.  Debtholders are protected by the 
equity cushion that must be exhausted before the firm’s losses eat 
into their principal.  Equity holders are protected in the sense that, 
in a world where bankruptcy is costly, substantial equity reduces 
the probability that bankruptcy will occur.  
The existence of the federal safety net for depository 
institutions [notably federal deposit insurance and access to the 
Federal Reserve discount window] increases the importance of 
capital, since the safety nest adds taxpayers to private debt-holders 
as potential losers if an institution fails.  Adequate capital holdings 
by depository institutions there fore have the following positive 
benefits: (1) lower the probability of bank failure; (2) reduces the 
incentive to take excessive risk; (3) asks as a buffer in front of the 
insurance fund and the taxpayer; (4) reduces the misallocation of 
credit caused by the safety net subsidy [e.g. the tendency for such a 
subsidy to foster the growth of weak banks relative to non-banks 
and healthy banks]; (5) helps avoid credit crunches; and (6) 
increases long-term competitiveness.28
Stunningly, there was a time when state regulators could set minimum capital 
requirements for state-chartered banks.  As with bank closure policy and reserve 
requirements, this rule led to several problems, as state regulators, in a regulatory world 
of federal deposit insurance, lacked the proper incentives to establish capital requirements 
for state-chartered banks that provided adequate protection for the federal deposit 
28
 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Modernizing the Financial System: Recommendations for Safer, More 
Competitive Banks II-1 (1991).
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insurance fund.  Federal regulators have more appropriate incentives because the cost of 
insufficient capitalization for banks is borne at the federal level.  By contrast, state 
regulators, by relaxing the levels of capital that banks are permitted to hold, can conduct 
their own homegrown macroeconomic policy by encouraging localized lending and over-
leveraging.  In doing so, the local regulators can, under the guise of “deregulation,” 
transfer wealth to local banks from the federal government and its deposit insurance fund. 
VI. Conclusion
The three case studies presented above, reserve requirements, bank closure policy, 
and minimum capital requirements, all represent situations in which the states, under the 
guise of “deregulation” inject market distortions into the regulatory system by relaxing 
rules that contribute to bank safety and soundness, which is a national issue.  The 
existence of federal deposit insurance suggests strongly that bank safety and soundness 
regulation should be dealt with at the national, and not the state or local, level.  The 
debacle of the S&L crisis and the concomitant insolvency of the Federal Savings and 
Loan Insurance Corporation were due in large part to the misallocation of regulatory 
responsibilities between the states and the federal government.  The problem was not 
deregulation in these cases; rather, the problem was insufficient regulation.  When the 
situation was corrected, the new regulations were market-mimicking in the sense that 
they replicated the rules that private insurance markets would have imposed if the federal 
deposit insurance scheme were to be privatized.  
The broader theme of this Article is that regulation at the appropriate level is often 
necessary to cause the market to function effectively.  Banks are very efficient at 
allocating capital, but they are very fragile economic entities.  Without government 
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intervention in the form of deposit insurance and access to emergency loans, banking 
crises of the kind that we observed during the Great Depression would be regular 
occurrences.  Thus, banking is a paradigmatic example of an industry in which regulation 
is necessary in order for a market, indeed for an entire industry, to function efficiently.  
Deposit insurance in particular is a necessity.  Not only does deposit insurance 
prevent bank runs and panics: it can also serve the valuable end of putting a ceiling on the 
extent to which the government will be expected to respond in case of a systemic banking 
crisis.  History has shown that, in the absence of de jure deposit insurance specifying the 
nature and extent of the government’s contingent liability to depositors in case of bank 
failure, there is no limit to the government’s exposure to creditors in case of bank failure.  
